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The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable
Distribution?
Courts1 and commentators2 are increasingly concerned with
the treatment of the marital home8 upon divorce. In part, this re-
flects a recognition of divorce's impact on children.4 A child's best
interests5 are often served by remaining in the marital home, near
friends and school, rather than by moving to unfamiliar surround-
ings.' Special consideration of the home is also fueled by the gen-
eral trend to limit periodic payments, such as alimony and child
support, and to consolidate the entire monetary settlement into
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1980);
Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980); Price v. Price, 484 P.2d 532
(Okla. 1971); Slatsky v. Slatsky, 42 Or. App. 281, 600 P.2d 885 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Perlberger, The Marital Residence-A Strategic Battleground, 81 DicL L.
REv. 699 (1977); Wagner, Apportionment of Home Equity in Marital Dissolutions Under
California Community Property Law: Is the Current Approach Equitable?, 9 COMMUNITY
PROP. J. 31 (1982); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181, 1204-
07 (1981).
3 The "marital home" refers here to a home owned by at least one of the parties during
the marriage that is subject to the scrutiny of the court upon divorce.
4 See generally Bane & Weiss, Alone Together, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1980, at 11, 15
(discussing the interests of children at time of divorce); Divorce Deluge, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS,
Oct. 1981, at 11 (discussing the increasing number of children affected by divorce).
' See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the "best interests" standard for child custody
determinations).
6 A study based on interviews with divorced mothers suggests the importance parents
attach to these factors. The survey reveals that divorced women make housing choices on
the basis of the following factors: (1) maintaining social contacts and established school
settings for the children; (2) maintaining their own social status and sense of community; (3)
finding help with child care and other supportive arrangements; (4) making new social con-
tacts for themselves; and (5) being within reasonable commuting range of jobs or job train-
ing. Anderson-Khleif, Housing Needs of Single-Parent Mothers, in BUILDING FOR WOMEN
21, 21-22 (S. Keller ed. 1981). The criteria Anderson-Khleif identifies will not always be
satisfied by the marital home, but the additional emotional and financial costs incurred in a
move could tip the balance in favor of retaining the marital home for the parent with cus-
tody of the children.
1089
The University of Chicago Law Review
the property award.7 Decreased reliance upon periodic payments
relieves courts of the burden of long-term enforcement s and avoids
the implication that one spouse is not self-sufficient," but it leaves
only the marital property to meet the parties' needs after divorce.10
Of the parties, the woman more frequently receives custody of the
children11 and is more likely to have lower income than the man.12
'See M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 52-63 (1981) (discussing
recent changes in the roles of alimony and property settlements); Weitzman & Dixon, The
Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 154 (1980)
(noting the drop in awards of alimony after institution of no-fault divorce); Note, Property
Division and Alimony Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limitations on Judicial Discretion,
50 FORDHAM L. REv. 415 (1981) (summarizing state statutory standards for property and
maintenance awards). The Iowa Supreme Court explained the traditional line between ali-
mony and property awards as follows:
Although property rights and alimony may be closely related, they are distinguishable
and have differing purposes. Division of property is based on each marital partner's
right to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated as the result of their
joint efforts. Alimony is an allowance to the ex-wife in lieu of the husband's legal obli-
gation to support her.
In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1981) (citations omitted).
8 See generally D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979) (describing methods of and
success in enforcing child support payments). A 1975 nationwide survey revealed that of
those divorced mothers awarded child support, only 47% were able to collect it regularly. B.
BRYANT, AMERICAN WOMEN TODAY AND TOMORROw 24 (1977) (Table 3-4).
9 Ruth Deech charges that alimony payments serve to "perpetuate the common law
proprietary relationship of the husband and wife after dissolution of the marriage bond"
and "express the superiority of the male." Deech, Why Maintenance is a Bad Bargain for
all Concerned, The Times (London), Feb. 14, 1980, at 8, col. 6. The decrease in alimony
awards has been a response both to the eliminaiion of punishment as a rationale for divorce
and to the recognition of a woman's capacity to support herself. Weitzman & Dixon, supra
note 7, at 148.
10 Some observers have suggested that the trend to value professional goodwill as a
divisible asset of the marriage may circumvent this problem by disguising alimony payments
as property settlements. See M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 67-68; Lurvey, Professional
Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is it Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST.
B.J. 27 (1977). This trend is quite significant, for as a study of Los Angeles divorces re-
vealed, community property is of low value relative to wage and salary income. See Weitz-
man, supra note 2, at 1188-94. In one year, the average couple can earn more than the total
value of their community assets, leading to the conclusion that "the spouses' earning capac-
ity is typically worth more than the tangible assets of the marriage." Id. at 1192 (emphasis
in original).
" In 1981, 13% of families with children under 18 were headed by divorced or sepa-
rated women, while 1% of these families were headed by a divorced father. See BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHAACTEISTICS: MARCH
1981, at 7 (1982) (Table D).
" 12 In Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives, and Divorce, in 4 FrvE THOUSAND AMERI-
CAN FAMILms-PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 23 (G. Duncan & J. Morgan eds. 1976),
divorce is identified as an accurate determinant of which individuals live in poverty. In the
study, wives and children were significantly more likely to be on welfare if they experienced
separation or divorce. Id. at 35. Husbands, on the other hand, experienced an average in-
crease in spendable income after divorce. Id. at 28. Other studies have yielded similar re-
sults. See D. CHAMBERs, supra note 8, at 42-66; Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 7, at 177-78.
1090 [50:1089
The Marital Home
Separate treatment of the marital home gives courts flexibility to
use the home as an item of support for the benefit of women and
children needing accommodation."3
Whether courts can achieve these goals depends on the discre-
tion available to them under state divorce law. Historically, two
regimes have governed marital property in the United States, com-
munity property and common law, distinguished respectively by
the principles of shared and individual ownership.' 4 The systems
have tended to converge over time and are now united in viewing
marriage as a partnership.1 5 Despite agreement on the partnership
principle, there are two different interpretations of its meaning for
property awards. The resulting dichotomy does not redraw the
common law/community property line, but distinguishes between
equal and equitable distribution of marital assets. 6 This comment
demonstrates that there are important differences in how these
two systems treat the marital home. Courts in states allowing equi-
table distribution of marital assets are better able to give special
consideration to the place of the home, while courts in states re-
quiring equal division of assets are more likely to make awards
that result in the sale of the home. The comment concludes that in
any distribution system it is desirable to have a law that permits
separate treatment of the home, and it identifies alternatives that
may satisfy this need.
See generally S. RAWLINGS, FAMILIES MAINTAINED BY FEMALE HOUSEHOLDERS 1970-79 (1980)
(discussing economic and social status of families headed by women); H. Ross & I. SAWHILL,
TIME OF TRANSITION: THE GROWTH OF FAMILIES HEADED BY WOMEN (1975) (same).
"3 Under the considerations mentioned in text, a strong case for special treatment of
the marital home would be a divorce involving a family (a) with several children in the
custody of one parent, (b) who had lived in the marital home for a few years and had estab-
lished relationships in the area, (c) where a comparable replacement home could not easily
be found, and (d) when sufficient funds would be available through periodic payments from
the non-custodial spouse or other sources to maintain the home and prevent a forced sale
soon after the divorce.
14 See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 249-
50 (1981); Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and
Common Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Cur-
rent View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV.
71 (1979) (tracing the origins and development of each system and comparing the effects of
each upon property rights at divorce and death); Comment, The Development of Sharing
Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1269, 1272-78
(1981) (discussing origins of both systems).
'5 See infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
'" See J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 636-37 (1978).
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I. DESCRIPTION OF STATE MARITAL PROPERTY LAWS
Although every state's marital property regime can be said to
follow either community property or common law principles, 17 the
distinction may be meaningless."8 At most it will determine which
property is subject to division at divorce, not how that division is
to be effected. In the eight community property states,i9 although
only property acquired during marriage is subject to division, most
property will be considered community property.20 Under the
traditional common law system retained by only three states, prop-
erty follows title.21 The majority of the states, however, have modi-
fied the common law title-based system so as to allow courts to
apportion all the property of the divorcing parties.22 This modifica-
17 See Freed & Foster, supra note 14.
18 See Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1977); Comment, supra note 14, at 1313 ("A myth is being perpetu-
ated that common law principles of divorce conflict with community property principles
when, in fact, the two systems have grown closer and closer together."). Common law sys-
tems are currently adopting principles of sharing from community property states, while
community property systems introduce concepts of equity borrowed from common law
states. See J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 636-44. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484
(1974), has been heralded as an early sign of the breakdown between common law and com-
munity property principles. See J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 643. In that decision, the court
considered the specific wording of the New Jersey equitable distribution statute and held
that the legislative intent was that "all property, regardless of its source, in which a spouse
acquires an interest during the marriage shall be eligible for distribution in the event of
divorce." Painter, 65 N.J. at 217, 320 A.2d at 495 (emphasis in original).
19 Arizona, Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1956); California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110
(West 1970 & Supp. 1983); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1982); Louisiana, LA. Crv.
CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West Supp. 1983); Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.220 (1979); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12 (1978); Texas, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon
1975); and Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1983).
20 J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 636. The California statute defines community property
as "property acquired by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when not acquired
as the separate property of either." CAL. Civ. CODE § 687 (West 1982).
21 FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1982); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-15 (1980). Special equity theories are employed in Florida and West Virginia to
enable a species of property division. See Note, supra note 7, at 433-34 & nn.133 & 138. For
example a person may acquire an equitable interest in property owned by his or her spouse
by making contribution to that property during the marriage. Id. See also Freed & Foster,
supra note 14, at 246 (spouse may develop equity by contributions to home during mar-
riage). In Mississippi, if a divorce is granted on grounds of irreconcilable differences, the
parties must make a written agreement "for the settlement of any property rights" between
them. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1982). The courts must, however, exercise discretion
when the parties submit their property to the judge. At that time, the judge may incorpo-
rate the agreement into the divorce decree or may modify the decree. Id.
2ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.210 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981); COLO. Rzv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp. 1981); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-2 (1982); HAwAn REv. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp.
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tion of the common law system reflects changed ideas of economic
fairness which dictate that the homemaker's nonmonetary contri-
butions to the marriage be recognized and acknowledges that title
is an inaccurate indicator of participation in the marriage." In this
manner "common law" states have accepted the view of marriage-
as-partnership that underlies the community property systems.24
The general acceptance of the partnership model has by no
means given rise to uniform laws as to how marital property, once
defined, 5 is to be divided. The states have adopted two different
methods, equal and equitable distribution of marital property.
2
1982); Marriage and Dissolution Act § 503, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (1981); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1610(b) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); M.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 552.19 (1967 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518.58 (West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330 (Vernon Supp. 1983); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 42-365 (1978); N.H. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West
Supp. 1982); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B) (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20 (Supp. 1981); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 3105-18 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1278 (West Supp. 1982); OE. Rav. STAT. § 107.105 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401
(Purdon Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN. §
25-4-44 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-821 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1982); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (Supp. 1982).
S See Comment, supra note 14, at 1270-71 & n.11. Most recently, New York, Act of
June 19, 1980, ch. 281, § 9, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225 (codified at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982)), North Carolina, Act of Oct. 1, 1981, ch. 815, § 1
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(6) (Supp. 1981)), and Pennsylvania, Act of April 2,
1980, No. 26, § 401, 1980 Pa. Laws 63 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1982)), have retired title-based systems in favor of statutes recognizing the efforts of
homemakers.
"' See Lay, Community Property: Its Origin and Importance to the Common Law At-
torney, 5 J. FAM. L.'51 (1965). See also Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 353-56, 421
N.E.2d 1293, 1297-99 (1981) (discussing partnership principle and applying it to common
law regime of property distribution); Dullea, 'Equitable Distribution' Divorce: Redefining
Who Gets What, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1980, at B19, col. 1 (describing new New York law,
see supra note 23, as being based on partnership theory).
'5 Comment, supra note 14, at 1282-84 (identifying three general methods of imple-
menting sharing principles in common law states: (1) deferred community property, (2) eq-
uitable distribution of property, and (3) expanded alimony). The problem of identifying
separate and marital property is not discussed here. For a general view of the law in this
area with specific reference to the home, see Wagner, supra note 2. This issue is also impli-
cated in awards of pensions, goodwill, and professional licenses. M. GLENDON, supra note 7,
at 67-68.
24 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (5th ed.
1979) defines "equitable distribution" as "[n]o-fault divorce statutes in certain states (e.g.
New Jersey) [that] grant courts the power to distribute equitably upon divorce all property
legally and beneficially acquired during marriage by husband and wife, or either of them,
whether legal title lies in their joint or individual names." The definition is not entirely
accurate, as some states with fault criteria allow for distribution of all marital property, see,
e.g., Marriage and Dissolution Act § 503, ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (1981), and therefore
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Equal division generally means awarding precisely equivalent
shares of marital property with little, if any, judicial discretion to
deviate from that norm.27 Equitable distribution allows for signifi-
cant judicial discretion; equity is the ultimate standard for any
property award.28
Equal division of property upon divorce is an accepted part of
the system in at least twelve states, 9 ranging from judicial pre-
sumption to statutory mandate. The community property states of
California,"0 Idaho,31 and Louisiana3 2 require equal division of mar-
ital property. In addition, New Mexico's community property stat-
ute has been construed to require equal division of marital prop-
erty.3s A statutory presumption in favor of equal division is
exercised in the "common law" states of Arkansas,"' North Caro-
lina,3 5 and Wisconsin."
may be classified as equitable distribution states. The word "equitable" is not always used,
see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1982) ("just and reasonable"); neither is
the word "equal." In Arizona, a community property state, the requirement of "equitable"
division, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1982), has been interpreted to require
"equal" division. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
2'7 See infra notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
30 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1983). The statute provides in pertinent part
(a) Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the
parties in open court, the court shall. .. divide the community property and the quasi-
community property of the parties, including any such property from which a home-
stead has been selected, equally ...
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may divide the community property
and quasi-community property of the parties as follows:
(1) Where economic circumstances warrant, the court may award any asset to one
party on such conditions as it deems proper to ... effect a substantially equal
division of the property.
31 IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1)(a) (Supp. 1982) ("Unless there are compelling reasons other-
wise, there shall be a substantially equal division in value, considering debts, between the
spouses.").
32 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 155, 159, 160 (West Supp. 1982).
" See Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974) (construing N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978)).
3 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1981).
35N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Supp. 1981): "There shall be an equal division by using
net value of marital property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equi-
table. If the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide
the marital property equitably." See also Knott v. Knott, 52 N.C. App. 543, 546-47, 279
S.E.2d 72, 75 (1981) (error to order unequal division); Note, Is There a Need for Equitable
Distribution of Property upon Divorce in North Carolina?: Leatherman v. Leatherman, 11
N.C. CENT. L.J. 156, 160 (1979) (discussing changes from title-based system to present
North Carolina law).
1 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982). ("The court shall presume that
all other property is to be divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribu-
1094 [50:1089
1983] The Marital Home 1095
In Texas, equal division of marital assets has been imposed 7
despite statutory language directing the courts to "order a division
... in a manner that the court deems just and right."38 Prior to
1976, the "just and right" test was interpreted to allow courts to
divest divorcing spouses of property not held jointly during mar-
riage.39 The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Eggemeyer v. Eg-
gemeyer'4 0 however, found the practice to be an unconstitutional
divestment of property.41 In the aftermath of Eggemeyer, commen-
tators urged a shift to California's equal distribution system 4 2 pri-
marily because consideration of "factors unrelated to the owner-
ship rights of the respective spouses is contradictory to the basic
policy underlying the use of partition between the owners of undi-
vided interests in property. 4
tion without regard to marital misconduct after considering: [the length of the marriage, the
desirability of awarding the home to the custodial parent, etc.]"). See Bartke & Zurvalec,
The Low, Middle and High Road to Marital Property Law Reform in Common Law Juris-
dictions, 7 COMMuNITY PROP. J. 200, 221-226, 228 (1980) (claiming that the Wisconsin stat-
ute adopts a community property model); Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compro-
mise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67
CORNELL L. Rav. 45, 74 (1981) (suggesting that Arkansas and Wisconsin come closer than
other common law states to recognizing marriage as a true partnership).
37 See Campbell v. Campbell, 625 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
3 Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1981). The statute also directs the court
to have "due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." Id.
39 Castleberry, Constitutional Limitations on the Division of Property Upon Divorce,
10 ST. MARY's L.J. 37, 38-39 (1978). The statutory provision enabling a divorce court to
divide and dispose of the property of the parties was first enacted in 1841. Act of Jan. 6,
1841, § 4, 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 20. In Halley v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299,
303 (1960), this was interpreted to mean only separate property. The statutory provision
that was enacted as § 3.63 of the Texas Family Code omitted any reference to separate
property, causing considerable confusion. Compare Ramirez v. Ramirez, 524 S.W.2d 767,
768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (§ 3.63 did not change former law) with Baxla v. Baxla, 522
S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that § 3.63 changed law) and Wilkerson v.
Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (same).
40 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977). Eggemeyer specifically approved Ramirez and deter-
mined that § 3.63 was enacted as a codification of existing law. Id. at 139, 142.
41 Id. at 139-40. The Eggemeyer case is discussed thoroughly in Castleberry, supra note
39.
" See Castleberry, supra note 39, at 51; Comment, Division of Marital Property on
Divorce: What Does the Court Deem "Just and Right?," 19 Hous. L. Rv. 503, 524-25
(1982).
43 Castleberry, supra note 39, at 51. The Eggemeyer decision does, however, leave room
for judicial discretion in extreme cases. One aspect of this discretion is the power of the
courts to consider children's needs when dividing property. Since the enactment of the
Texas Code in 1841, "the property division statute has provided that the rights of children
shall be considered in making the division." McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 35
Sw. L.J. 93, 138 (1981) (footnote omitted). Most recently in Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d
758 (Tex. 1980), the Texas Supreme Court held that the right of support of a disabled,
unmarried adult child in the care of a spouse could be considered in making a division of
property in divorce. Id. at 760. Apparently, occupancy of the separate home of one spouse in
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Arizona is experiencing a similar trend toward equal division."
The Arizona Supreme Court in 1976 in Hatch v. Hatch45 held that
unequal property distribution is an unconstitutional deprivation of
the wife's vested property interest in the community assets.48
Though there was some speculation that equitable considerations
might enable courts to adjust awards,47 the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals rejected this idea in Lee v. Lee4 and required that any award
be "substantially equal."49 Similar debates surrounded the adop-
tion in New York5" and Pennsylvania51 of new domestic relations
statutes in 1980.52 Although both states enacted laws in the equita-
some cases may be awarded to the custodial spouse. See McKnight, supra, at 139.
"" See Comment, Arizona Property Division Upon Marital Dissolution, 1979 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 411, 416-17.
45 113 Ariz. 130, 547 P.2d 1044 (1976).
46 Id. at 134, 547 P.2d at 1048. See Comment, supra note 44, at 414-15. Legislation in
1973 substituted "equitably" for "just and right" as the standard for property division. Id.
at 412. Though Hatch was decided under the pre-1973 "just and right" standard, the courts
have not recognized a change in the law--"equitably" has been construed as a variation of
"just and right." Id. at 417.
47 See Comment, supra note 44, at 417, which states that "there is an established pat-
tern of wide discretion in dividing the property, so long as the trial court begins from the
premise that the division should be substantially equal, a premise which can only be over-
come with sound reasons for the division." Id. But see Fong v. Fong, 121 Ariz. 298, 589 P.2d
1330 (Ct. App. 1978) (extreme need of wife not sufficient to rebut presumption of equal
division).
"1 133 Ariz. 118, 649 P.2d 997 (Ct. App. 1982).
9 Id. at 121, 649 P.2d at 1000 ("The only inherent limitation on the power of the trial
court to apportion community property is that the division, in the final analysis, must result
in a substantially equal distribution which neither rewards nor punishes either party." (cita-
tion omitted)).
" See Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 34
(1981); Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 BROoKLYN L.
Rav. 67, 77-78 (1980); Recent Developments, Equitable Distribution in New York, 45 ALB.
L. REV. 483 (1981). The New York law replaces a title-based system. See N.Y. DOM. Ran.
LAw § 236 (McKinney 1977), amended by N.Y. DoM. Ran. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp.
1981).
51 Fingerman, Problems, Procedures and Possibilities Under the New Divorce Code, 51
PA. B.A.Q. 192 (1980); Lippincott, Highlights of Pennsylvania's New No-Fault Divorce
Law, 51 PA. B.A.Q. 185 (1980); Raphael, Family Law, 52 PA. B.A.Q. 16 (1981).
52 Freed & Foster, supra note 14, at 230, ironically observe that Pennsylvania women's
groups lobbied for equal division, while in New York equal division was opposed by the
state chapter of N.O.W. In New York, Doris Sassower, a divorce lawyer, argued that the
adoption of equitable distribution over an equal presumption would "throw our courts into
chaos" and provide no guidance to parties settling out of court. See Sassower, Looking
Anew for Fair Divorce Law, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, § 22, at 18, col. 1. In response,
supporters of equitable distribution cited the often inequitable results in California. See
Rankin, Property Settlements, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1980, § 1, at A30, col. 1. The New York
legislators were offered a clear choice, as bills representing both positions were on the floor
for consideration at the same time. See Sassower, supra.
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ble distribution mode,53 Pennsylvania courts have informally
adopted a presumption of equal division,5 and New York courts
have also favored equal division. 5 Iowa courts have done the
same,58 but both Iowa and New York allow the presumption to be
overcome in a well-defined category of cases where equal division is
considered inequitable.57
II. THE EFFECTS OF EQUAL AND EQUITABLE PROPERTY DIVISION
LAWS ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE MARITAL HOME
A. Equal Division and the Marital Home
1. California. In Duke v. Duke,5 8 a California Court of Appeal
panel articulated why the marital home should be treated differ-
ently from other marital property:
The value of the family home to its occupants cannot be mea-
sured solely by its value in the marketplace. The longer the
occupancy, the more important these non-economic factors
become and the more traumatic and disruptive a move to a
new environment is to children whose roots have become
firmly entwined in the school and social milieu of their
neighborhood.5
3 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§
401-402 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
"See, e.g., Paul W. v. Margaret W., 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 3013, 3014 (Allegheny
County Ct. Dec. 1, 1981).
55 See, e.g, Majauskas v. Majauskas, 110 Misc. 2d 323, 328, 441 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Sup.
Ct. 1981) ("Enactment of the new Equitable Distribution Law in New York State allows the
courts to 'go behind the scenes' of a marriage and hopefully give both spouses an equal
division of the parties' marital property.").
" See, e.g., Schissel v. Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1980) ("We have rejected a
mechanical rule that each spouse must receive one-half of the marital assets, but we have
recognized that equal division of marital property is often equitable." (citations omitted)).
'7 See Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968) (formulating exceptions to
equal division, later incorporated into statute at IowA CODE § 598.21 (1981)); Wobser v.
Wobser, 458 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (App. Div. 1982) ("Only where one spouse has demonstrated
an overriding need to occupy the marital premises, is an award of exclusive possession
proper." (citations omitted)); Wurm v. Wurm, 87 A.D.2d 590, 591, 447 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759
(1982) (overriding need for unequal division since divorced husband had history of failure to
fulfill financial obligations).
101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1980).
8, Id. at 155-56, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The court found that "[t]he economics of ob-
taining equivalent housing for a minor child's welfare is certainly well within the legislative
intent expressed by the statute." Id. at 157, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (citing Hermann v. Her-
mann, 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978)). The court remanded the case for
consideration of these factors and for possible deferral of the sale of the home. Id. at 160,
161 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
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Nevertheless, California requires equal division of the marital as-
sets almost without exception. 0 According to the courts, equal di-
vision was "the fundamental objective of the Legislature""1 in
adopting the Family Law Act in 1969.2 If "economic circum-
stances"6 warrant, awards need not be in kind, but the court may
award any asset to one party only on conditions that will lead to a
substantially equal division of property."" Thus, the approach to
home awards outlined in the Duke opinion seems without support
in the Family Law Act. Moreover, the case law belies the Duke
assumption that non-economic factors will be considered.
A California Court of Appeal's discussion in Juick v. Juick65
demonstrates the problems of reconciling equal division and pres-
ervation of the marital home. The trial court awarded custody of
the two children along with the marital home to the wife. The wife
was required to make monthly payments to the husband for his
share of the equity in the house.66 He appealed, objecting that the
division of assets was not immediate and that there was no provi-
sion for the effect of inflation on the value of the wife's payments
to him.67 The court of appeal held that he had no right to the im-
mediate enjoyment of an asset, but found that deferred enjoyment
80 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1983). The statute is reprinted in part supra
note 30.
6' Juick v. Juick, 21 Cal. App. 3d 421, 427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324, 329 (1971) ("Under the
Family Law Act clearly the ideal is a mathematically equal division." (footnote omitted)).
See also Tammen v. Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 927, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162 (1976)
(home awarded to wife on execution of promissory note; remanded as unequal since note's
face value failed to take account of uncertainty, inflation, and concerns of ownership).
82 Act of Sept. 5, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3333 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §
4800 (West Supp. 1983)). This Act was the first of a flurry of statutes instituting "no fault"
divorce. Prior to the Act, property awards reflected the guilt or innocence of the divorcing
parties. See Goddard, A Report on California's New Divorce Law: Progress and Problems, 6
FAm. L.Q. 405, 406 (1972). The Family Law Act introduced principles of "partnership" and
imposed fifty-fifty division. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 4800 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983).
63 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1983). The custody of minor children qualifies as
an " economic circumstance." Emmett v. Emmett, 109 Cal. App. 3d 753, 169 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1980) (award of residence to wife balanced by award of pension to husband). This discre-
tion has been confined to situations where an asset cannot be divided without impairment of
the principal. Brigden v. Brigden, 80 Cal. App. 3d 380, 391, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716, 724 (1978).
" CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1983). The trend to value goodwill may be a
response to the need to balance awards of one large asset, such as the marital home, with an
award to the other spouse of equal value. See M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 67-68. See also
supra note 10.
85 21 Cal. App. 3d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1971).
68 Id. at 423-24, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The parties had been married 10 years and the
children were aged seven and nine. In addition to making payments to her husband for his
share of the equity in the house, the wife assumed a $10,407 encumbrance on the house. A
lien on the property secured the payments to the husband. Id.
67 Id. at 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27.
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was relevant in assessing the equality of the division., As to the
effects of inflation, the court held that "when monies to be ac-
quired by one's spouse in the future are injected as an element,
there is no reason why the effort should not be made to reach
mathematical equality."' 9 Applying this rather strict and literal
test of equal division, the court remanded the case for further find-
ings and, if necessary, a modification of the installment
arrangement.7 0
The debilitating effect of this strict equality requirement on
efforts to award the marital home to the party with custody of mi-
nor children becomes more apparent in cases decided after Juick.
In Holmgren v. Holmgren"1 upon the breakup of a twenty-one-
year marriage, the wife received custody of the minor child. 2 The
wife claimed that the home was her only "real security1 73 and that
its sale would be unreasonable under the circumstances, but the
court applied the equal division standard. Since the wife was
financially unable to purchase the husband's share of the house,
the house was sold and the proceeds divided.74 In Gonzales v. Gon-
zales,7 5 the trial court had awarded the use and possession of the
marital home to the wife, but left title to the property in the hus-
band and wife as tenants in common.7 6 The California Court of
Appeal determined that the trial court awarded the home to the
wife "because economically, based on its then determination of the
respective property interests, and environmentally, it felt it was
best for her and the children. '7 7 Nevertheless, the arrangement
was remanded for modification in compliance with the equality
standard. 8
After Holmgren and Gonzales, only those arrangements that
are arithmetically equal appear to be able to withstand a court's
Id. at 424-25, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
" Id. at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
70 Id. at 430-31, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32.
71 60 Cal. App. 3d 869, 130 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1976).
7 Id. at 871-72, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 441. The wife apparently had little independent in-
come and had failed to find work due to lack of education. Id.
73 Id. at 872, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
74 Id. at 873, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
75 116 Cal. App. 3d 556, 172 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1981).
76 Id. at 560, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 181. The husband challenged the cotenancy requirement
and also argued that the order was improper insofar as the trial court characterized it as an
award of additional child support. Id. at 565, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 184. See generally Annot, 2
A.L.R.3D 596 (1965 & Supp. 1982) (discussing the propriety of an undivided award for both
child support and spousal maintenance).
7 116 Cal. App. 3d at 565, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
79 Id. at 565-66, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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scrutiny on appeal. Since the home is often the couple's largest as-
set, it can seldom be balanced off by other awards when equal divi-
sion is mandated. Thus the requirements of equal division inhibit
outright awards of the marital home to either party, even if judges
recognize a need to preserve the home.
2. Equal Division in Other States. Through statute and judi-
cial interpretation, other states have adopted equal division stan-
dards similar to California's.79 These laws, too, may pose obstacles
to treating the marital home differently from other marital prop-
erty. For example, the Idaho statute allows deviation from equal
division only for "compelling reasons."80 Judicial construction of
the law, citing California precedent, places the burden of persuad-
ing the trial court to award other than a fifty-fifty distribution on
the party asserting the need for inequality."' This burden is dispro-
portionately strong because the spouse requiring additional sup-
port may have fewer resources with which to combat an unfavora-
ble presumption.
The effect of a strong presumption of absolute equality is ap-
parent in Wisconsin case law. In Drews v. Drews,82 for example,
because there was "no clear case for a property share in excess of
50%," the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's
decision to award sixty percent of the marital property to the wife
and forty percent to the husband.83 Yet the wife had custody of
the couple's child and a full-time salary considerably less than half
of her husband's.84 In another Wisconsin case, the court imposed a
fifty-fifty split of the marital assets despite the fact that the effect
of the division was to force a sale of the marital home.85
3. The Effects of Equal Division in California. A recent sur-
vey86 illustrates the effect the equal division system in California
79 See supra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
80 IDAHO CODE § 32.712(2) (Supp. 1982).
81 See Guy v. Guy, 560 P.2d 876 (Idaho 1977) (equal allocation of community property
appropriate in absence of factors requiring otherwise).
82 87 Wis. 2d 916, 274 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979) (unpublished limited precedent
opinion available in full August 8, 1983, on LEXIS, States Library, Wisc. File).
83 Id.
8 Id.
85 Glatz v. Glatz, 92 Wis. 2d 909, 286 N.W.2d 646 (1979) (unpublished limited prece-
dent opinion available in full August 8, 1983, on LEXIS, States Library, Wisc. File).
88 Weitzman, supra note 2. Weitzman collected and analyzed court records from San
Francisco and Los Angeles Counties in 1968, 1972, and 1977. Forty-four family court judges
were interviewed in 1974 and 1975, and 26 completed questionnaires in 1981. In 1974 and
1975 Weitzman further interviewed 169 matrimonial attorneys in Los Angeles and San
Francisco, and in 1974 she interviewed 114 recently divorced men and 114 recently divorced
women in the Los Angeles area. She stratified the latter sample by length of marriage and
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has had on the disposition of the marital home after divorce.
Forty-six percent of those surveyed owned or had some equity in a
home, as compared to an eleven percent ownership rate for other
real estate and businesses. 87 Additionally, families with minor chil-
dren were found more likely to own homes than were childless
couples; only thirty-three percent of couples without children were
homeowners, while sixty-five percent of families with young chil-
dren owned a home."8
Data on home awards in California were compiled before and
after the adoption of the Family Law Act and the equal division
requirement." The study indicates that with the implementation
of no-fault divorce and the equal division standard in 1969,90 more
homes were divided equally: from one-fourth of the homes in 1968
to one-third in 1977.91 There was a corresponding decline in the
percentage of cases in which the greater part of the home equity
was awarded to the wife;' the presence of minor children did not
increase the likelihood that the wife would be awarded the marital
home.9 s The number of cases in which there was an explicit order
to sell the home rose from about one in ten in 1968 to about one in
three in 1977." By 1977, in most cases in which the home was a
marital asset subject to division, it was sold rather than awarded
intact.' The study concludes that concern over "the effects of a
forced sale of the home on the children appears to be well-founded
since our data reveal that 66% of the couples who were forced to
sell their homes had minor children."'"
socioeconomic status. Id. at 1186-87. See also Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 7, at 144-45.
87 Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1193, 1196. The median value of the homes in 1977-1978
was near $33,000. Id. at 1193.
" Id. at 1205 n.77.
,Id. at 1186-87.
See generally Krom, California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1
PAc. L.J. 156 (1970) (examining the legislative history of California's Family Law Act of
1969, which abandoned the fault theory of divorce and implemented the equal division stan-
dard of property allocation); Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 7 (examining the effects of
California's no-fault provision).
"1 Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1204-05. "Equal division" can mean either joint owner-
ship by the parties or sale and division of proceeds. Id. at 1204.
"2 Id. This finding supports the earlier observation in Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 7,
that "under the new law wives were less likely to receive the house [and] furnishings... and
more likely to take on obligations to repay part of the community debts." Id. at 184 n.85
(emphasis in original).
Is Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1205.
"Id.
95 Id.
"Id. The report indicates that a substantial proportion of lawyers and judges in Cali-
fornia perceive inequity in the equal division system. Though over 80% of those interviewed
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B. Equitable Division and the Marital Home
Equitable division regimes are characterized by flexible statu-
tory guidelines, which can accommodate special consideration of
the home.97 In equitable division states, awards of the home's use
or possession have been based on the need to "retain the stability
of the family home for the [custodial spouse] and minor chil-
dren,""" "the financial and emotional needs of the children," s9 the
need for shelter, 100 "'the adverse effect a change in surroundings
often has on children of tender years,' -'o' the cost of arranging for
sale depleting resources available for support,1 2 and simply the
best interests of the children involved.'03 When an award of the
home or its use has not been made, the reasons given are usually
economic-that there was too little property of the marriage to en-
able equitable distribution at all.' 04
The law of Connecticut exemplifies the flexibility of an equita-
ble division regime. Connecticut adopted no-fault divorce in 1973
while retaining the theory that property held during the marriage
agreed that equal division was basically fair, close to 40% thought that judges should be
allowed more discretion in dividing community property, specifically the marital home. Id.
at 1200. Attorneys who concluded that there was enough discretion in the system pointed to
the role of judges in assigning value to community property and setting support awards. Id.
97 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); Marriage and Dissolution Act § 503,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (1981); IowA CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns 1980).
" Collette v. Collette, 177 Conn. 465, 470, 418 A.2d 891, 894 (1979) (upholding award of
husband's interest in jointly-owned family home).
Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 184 N.J. Super. 423, 428, 446 A.2d 537, 539 (1982). See also
Paul W. v. Margaret W., 8 FAP. L. REP. (BNA) 3013 (Allegheny County Ct. Dec. 1, 1981)
(award of home to minimize disruption of minor child's life).
100 See, e.g., Lavery v. Lavery, 208 Kan. 603, 492 P.2d 1311 (1972) (order other than
award of home would leave mother and children without shelter); Price v. Price, 484 P.2d
532 (Okla. 1971) (now that wife did not have custody, court no longer recognized need to
maintain a home for the children); Stearns v. Stearns, 80 S.D. 443, 126 N.W.2d 124 (1964)
(award of home to custodial parent to provide a home for the children).
101 Slatsky v. Slatsky, 42 Or. App. 281, 284, 600 P.2d 885, 886 (1979) (quoting Johnson
v. Johnson, 245 Or. 10, 16, 419 P.2d 28, 30-31 (1966)) (minimum disruption in children's
lives is an important factor in property division).
102 See Tomko v. Tomko, 69 Pa. D. & C.2d 466, 472 (Bucks County Ct. 1975).
10" See, e.g., Molnar v. Molnar, 110 Mich. App. 622, 313 N.W.2d 171 (1981) (award of
home to custodial parent for benefit of minor child no longer justified after child's death);
Vanet v. Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (courts have broad discretion to
consider statutory mandate concerning welfare of minor children when awarding home);
Johnson v. Lowary, 81 S.D. 202, 132 N.W.2d 823 (1965) (court may assign use and posses-
sion of home as welfare and best interests of children require).
1'4 See, e.g., Swinney v. Swinney, 419 N.E.2d 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (custody alone
will not support award of a residence when residence is sole marital asset); Dowie v. Dowie,
215 N.W.2d 276 (Iowa 1974) (maintenance costs of home make award to custodial parent
impossible).
1102 [50:1089
The Marital Home
belongs to the spouse who holds title.105 At the time of dissolution,
however, judges may modify the separate property principle based
on consideration of equitable factors, including the length of the
marriage, the parties' ages, health, and station, their occupations,
the amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,
the size of the estate, the liabilities and needs of each party, the
opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and in-
come, and the contribution of the parties in the acquisition, preser-
vation, or appreciation in value of their respective estates.110
A 1976 survey of divorces in Connecticut,10 7 when compared
with the California study, °10  illustrates how differently equal and
equitable division schemes affect the disposition of the marital
home. The Connecticut study revealed that when houses were
jointly held by the divorcing parties (about sixty-eight percent of
the cases), the court ordered sale and division in about sixteen per-
cent of the cases,109 less than half the rate recorded in California
for 1977.110 The Connecticut study also found that fifteen percent
of the women who were awarded the family home were forced to
sell it to meet financial obligations.1 1 Comparable data for Califor-
nia indicate that almost two-thirds of the children involved in a
divorce had changed their place of residence within three years of
the divorce.112 If half of this group represents divorces where the
home was ordered sold,s a substantial proportion of the remain-
der must represent families that moved because financial pressures
100 1973 Conn. Acts 373 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-81 (West Supp. 1982)).
106 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1982).
107 PERMANENT COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MARITAL
DISSOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CONNECTICUT MEN AND WOMEN (1979) [hereinafter
cited as MARITAL DISSOLUTION].
108 See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
109 MARITAL DISSOLUTION, supra note 107, at 19.
11 Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1205.
' MARITAL DISSOLUTION, supra note 107, at 19.
11 See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP How CHILDREN AND PAR-
ENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 183 (1980). For similar statistics compiled in Massachusetts, see
Anderson-Khleif, supra note 6, at 35. Anderson-Khleif's data do not separate awards from
eventual sales and therefore cannot be directly compared here. In general, divorced female
household heads are likely to move more frequently than the general population. Forty-five
percent of Americans over age five changed their residence between 1975 and 1980. The
Numbers News, 5 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS SUpP. 3 (1982) (figures from the U.S. Census Bureau).
But in 1980, about 75% of divorced women moved at least once by the end of the third year
after marriage ended, and more than one-half moved at least twice by the end of the fourth
year. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DE'T OF H.U.D., HOUSING OUR FAMILIES
3-4 (1980). See also Bane & Weiss, supra note 4, at 11.
113 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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forced them out of the marital home. One can thus infer that
under an equitable distribution regime like Connecticut's not only
do courts order the sale of the marital home in fewer cases, but
sale of the home is the practical result of divorce in fewer cases
than under a strict equal division regime like California's.
III. SPECIAL REGIMES FOR THE MARrAL HoME
Because the marital home is often the largest asset of a divorc-
ing couple and because of the unique services that it provides," 4
the home commands special attention in any system of distribu-
tion, equal or equitable. It is only reasonable that a distinct set of
rules would surround the home's disposition. 115 Even in California,
in order to preserve the home for the custodial parent and chil-
dren, courts need not divide marital assets in kind,11 e though this
provision is severely hampered by the equal division require-
ment." "1 This part describes various methods by which jurisdic-
tions have provided for special consideration of the marital home,
and the comment concludes by comparing the utility and effective-
ness of these techniques.
A. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act"' ("UMDA") sets out
two alternative approaches to property division, both within an eq-
uitable division framework and both enabling a court to make spe-
cial provisions for the home." 9 Alternative A is recommended for
common law jurisdictions" and lists factors to be considered when
"equitably apportion[ing]" the property.12 1 In doing so, the court is
14 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
115 M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 81 (calling these rules a "special legal regime for the
matrimonial dwelling").
See supra notes 30, 63 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
118 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. 91 (1979).
119 Id. § 307, 9A U.L.A. at 142.
120 Id. Commissioners' Comment, 9A U.L.A. at 144.
121 In making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and
prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, es-
tate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the ap-
portionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for
future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contri-
bution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or
appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a
homemaker or to the family unit.
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directed to consider, among other factors, "custodial provisions"
and "whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to
maintenance." '122 Alternative B123 is tailored to community prop-
erty regimes124 and explicitly requires that courts consider "the de-
sirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein
for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of any chil-
dren. 1 25 Both alternatives focus on where and how the custodial
spouse and children are to be housed.126
Although versions of the UMDA have been adopted in only six
states, 27 alternatives to the Model Act have had a significant im-
pact on other state statutes. 128 Eleven states statutorily require
courts to consider the desirability of awarding the marital home to
the spouse receiving custody of the children.12 9 Two other jurisdic-
tions list "custody of the children" as a factor to be considered
when dividing the property.130 The listed factors are not exhaus-
tive, and all of these statutes permit judges to adjust the property
award in favor of the custodial spouse, often with express reference
to the children's needs.1 31
In re Marriage of Anderson 3 2 illustrates the possible effect of
Alternative B's provision that the courts consider "the desirability
of awarding the family home ... to the spouse having custody of
Id. (Alternative A), 9A U.L.A. at 142.
122 Id.
1,3 Id. (Alternative B), 9A U.L.A. at 143.
124 Id. Commissioners' Comment, 9A U.L.A. at 144.
125 Id. (Alternative B), 9A U.L.A. at 143.
I's Id. § 307.
12 Arizona, Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1976); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
113 (1973 & Supp. 1982); Illinois, Marriage and Dissolution Act § 503, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 503 (1981); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); Minne-
sota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West 1980 & Supp. 1981); and Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-202 (1981).
128 See Note, supra note 7, at 448 app. B.
120 Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(c) (1973 & Supp. 1982); Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(8) (1974); Illinois, Marriage and Dissolution Act § 503, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(4), (8) (1981); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(b)(3) (Burns
1980); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(g) (West 1981); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
403.190(l)(d) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1)(C)
(1964); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330.1(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983); New York, N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.09.080(4) (Supp. 1983); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(7) (West 1981 & Supp.
1982).
130 The District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(b) (1981 & Supp. 1982), and
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1981).
13 See statutes cited supra notes 127, 129-30. Wisconsin is an exception, as it incorpo-
rates a presumption of equal division. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
132 541 P.2d 1274 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
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any children."1 ' The Colorado Court of Appeals in Anderson ap-
plied the Colorado distribution statute, which embodies Alterna-
tive B, T3 to uphold the award of the marital home to the custodial
spouse. The court noted that the child of the divorcing couple
"might be further disturbed if forced to move away from the home,
neighborhood school, and friends," 3 5 and concluded that this divi-
sion of the property was "within the ambit of the court's discre-
tion" where the court based its order on "the need for the custo-
dial parent to retain the family home" and "the economic
circumstances of the parties."138
As an alternative to awarding the marital home to the custo-
dial spouse, the UMDA also suggests granting the custodial spouse
the right to live in the home for a reasonable period.137 Some
courts have achieved this by relying on a trust for sale, leaving the
property in possession of the custodial spouse to benefit the chil-
dren. 38 Typically, sale of the house depends on some future event
(such as the children's majority) at which time the proceeds will be
divided between the spouses.139
132 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. at 143 (1979).
134 See COLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
135 541 P.2d at 1276.
136 Id. Special equities employed by Florida and West Virginia courts also enable
awards of the marital home to the custodial spouse. See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d
949, 952 (Fla. 1980) (exclusive possession of the home may be granted to support minor
children); Power v. Power, 387 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("The award of the
residence... [is] a facet of child support."); Dolch v. Dolch, 368 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (order to sell home error when it is unlikely that wife will be able to obtain
housing for herself and children from amount yielded from sale); Murredu v. Murredu, 236
S.E.2d 452, 456 (W. Va. 1977) (lower court was correct in awarding house to husband "as a
result of his obtaining custody of the children").
137 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (Alternative B), 9A U.L.A. at 143.
'" See, e.g., Schuppe v. Schuppe, 69 Ill. App. 3d 200, 387 N.E.2d 346 (1979) (trust for
sale is not unfair); Twardosky v. Twardosky, 113 N.H. 438, 309 A.2d 217 (1973) (trust for
sale with possession to wife until remarriage or until youngest child reaches age 18). A trust
for sale may rest on beneficial co-ownership of the property or upon a settlement that enti-
tles the noncustodial spouse to a future interest in the property. For discussion of this type
of award and its application to the marital home, see Forrest, Trusts for Sale and Co-own-
ership-A Case for Reform, 42 CoNy. & PROP. LAw.' (n.s.) 194 (1978); Hayes & Battersby,
Property Adjustment Orders and the Matrimonial Home, 45 CoNy. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 404
(1981); and Miller, Sale of the Matrimonial Home, 42 CoNy. & PROP. LAw. (n.s.) 301 (1978).
139 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (setting
out an elaborate formula for division of the proceeds); Brugger v. Brugger, 303 Minn. 488,
492, 229 N.W.2d 131, 134 (1975) (trust for sale imposed with "the provisions for child sup-
port and the use of the homestead and its ultimate sale... taken into account in balancing
other portions of judgment").
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B. Great Britain
In Great Britain a separate legal regime for the marital home
is already acknowledged in principle140 and clearly articulated in
case law.141 The Matrimonial Causes Act ("M.C.A."), which gov-
erns property distribution upon divorce, is of the equitable distri-
bution variety and leaves ample room for judicial discretion.142 The
tools of distribution are like those of American jurisdictions: sale
and division, trust for sale, and outright award,1 43 but English
courts have focused more clearly on the needs of the parties, par-
ticularly on the children's needs. Two guiding principles based on
needs have emerged in recent English cases: (1) adequate provision
should be made to ensure support and accommodation of the chil-
dren of the marriage, and (2) some provision should be made to
meet the needs of each spouse when those needs have been occa-
sioned by the marriage breakdown. 144 The courts have emphasized
these needs above the property rights of the parties, especially in
140 See Eekelaar, Some Principles of Financial and Property Adjustment on Divorce,
95 LAw Q. REV. 253, 253-57 (1979).
141 See infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
141 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 25. The M.C.A. lists the following factors to
guide judges in making property adjustment orders:
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each
of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to
the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the
marriage;
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
(W) the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family,
including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;
(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either
of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason
of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of
acquiring.
Id.
14 Id. § 24.
144 Eekelaar, supra note 140, at 256. Eekelaar argues that courts have followed these
principles in derogation of the "minimal loss" principle written into § 25 of the M.C.A. Id.
at 5, 267-69. This principle requires that the court "place the parties so far as is practicable.
.. in the position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and
each had properly discharged his or her obligations and responsibilities to the other."
M.C.A. § 25(1). There is no counterpart to this clause in the American UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT (1979). The minimal loss principle has been much criticized, see, e.g., Eeke-
laar, supra note 140, at 255-56, 261-62, and a recent Law Commission report recommends
its abolition. LAw COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 7 (1981) (No.
112).
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determining the disposition of the marital home.145 As one English
court explained,
whenever a court is dealing with families of limited resources,
"needs" are likely to be much more important than resources,
when it comes to exercising discretion. In most individuals
and most families the most urgent need is a home. It is there-
fore to the provision of homes for all concerned that the
courts should direct their attention in the first place. 146
The emphasis on needs has also led many courts to reject the no-
tion of a "clean break, "147 or final financial settlement upon di-
vorce. For example, in Moore v. Moore,148 the court held that the
clean break principle should not be adopted in cases in which a
continuing link between the parties exists through children or in
situations in which one of the parties would have to obtain support
from the state. 49
The English courts have stressed the importance of the home
to adequate child support to the extent that "it is now a common
feature of dissolution proceedings for the property rights eventu-
ally to be adjusted so as to give priority to the accommodation of
the spouse who is looking after the children."18 0 The courts have
implemented this goal with the device of a trust for sale. Both par-
ties retain beneficial ownership in the home, but the custodial
spouse has possession during their children's minority. 5' This
14' See Freeman, When Marriage Fails-Some Legal Responses to Marriage Break-
down, 31 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 109, 128-29 (1978).
148 Browne v. Pritchard, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1366, 1371 (C.A.) (Ormrod, L.J.). In this case
the wife had remarried and the husband was living in the marital home with two children
from a previous marriage. The wife claimed the house should be sold and the proceeds di-
vided equally. Id. at 1367. The court determined that to do so would deprive the husband
and his children of suitable housing and concluded that "to order the sale of this house now
could properly be described as socially disastrous, if not irresponsible. Therefore the sale
must be postponed." Id. at 1371.
147 See, e.g., Minton v. Minton, 1979 A.C. 593 (1978); Dunford v. Dunford, [1980] 1
W.L.R. 5 (C.A. 1979). See also LAw COMMISSION, supra note 144, at 11 ("[I]t must be ac-
cepted that the occasions on which it is possible for the parties to arrive at a final, once and
for all settlement, on the occasion of their divorce will be comparatively few, and almost
non-existent when there are young children.").
18 The Times (London), May 10, 1980, at 7, col. 1 (C.A. 1980).
149 
-Id.
150 Bassett v. Bassett, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 270, 280 (C.A. 1974).
151 See, e.g., Browne v. Pritchard, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1366 (C.A.) (sale six months after
youngest child reaches 18); Allen v. Allen, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1171 (C.A.) (sale postponed until
younger child reaches 17 or finishes full-time education, whichever occurs earlier); Chamber-
lain v. Chamberlain, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1557 (C.A.) (sale upon completion of children's edu-
caton); Hector v. Hector, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1122 (CA.) (sale postponed until child reaches age
16). This type of award and its consequences are discussed in Hayes & Battersby, supra
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technique is called a "Mesher order" 152 after Mesher v. Mesher,1 5 3
one of the first cases to order such an arrangement. In Mesher it-
self, the wife had remained with the couple's child in the marital
home. To avoid depriving the husband of his property interest but
at the same time to provide housing for the wife and child, the
court imposed a trust for sale.154 Similarly, in Harvey v. Harvey
55
the court reconciled the competing property rights of the spouses
with the children's need for a home by means of a Mesher order.
The court justified its order by referring to the parties' initial in-
tent when they invested in the home:
[T]his asset would never have been available to either of the
parties as a capital or income producing asset as such, whilst
they both survived and whilst their marriage subsisted ....
They would not have had the asset to realize during the cur-
rency of their marriage unless they had both agreed to obtain
less expensive accommodation after their family had grown up
and left them.5 "
The court concluded that the sale should be postponed for the
wife's lifetime, with an occupation rent to be paid to the husband
after the children's emancipation.1 5 7
The English courts and Parliament are still developing tech-
niques to resolve the tension between the needs approach and
property rights,158 but the British recognition of the special nature
of the marital home among marital properties seems well estab-
lished.1 59 According to Lord Denning,
note 138, at 407-14. Two other types of orders are frequently directed at the marital home
upon divorce. One is a charge order, which resembles a trust for sale with the exception that
it does not reflect a real interest in the property. The nonresident spouse has merely a
security interest in the home. The second type of arrangement is a settlement order, which
settles the property upon the custodial spouse and a future interest upon the noncustodial
party. A trust for sale may also be imposed as part of a settlement order, but a settlement
need not rest on beneficial co-ownership of the property. See Hayes & Battersby, supra note
138, at 414-22.
" See, e.g., Eekelaar, supra note 140, at 257.
153 [1980] 1 All E.R. 126 (C.A. 1973).
15 Id. at 128. Before Mesher the idea of a trust for sale had been rejected in Jones v.
Challenger, [1961] 1 Q.B. 176. The court there ruled that the purpose of the marital home
was at an end when the marriage ended. Id. at 183.
15 [1982] 1 All E.R. 693 (C.A.).
I" Id. at 696.
167 Id. at 697.
"' See M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 84. See also LAw COMMISSION, supra note 144, at
7-9 (tension between certainty and flexibility).
"' The development of mechanisms to sidestep property rights and award the home
based on needs indicates the trend in Anglo-American law toward a separate legal regime
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[w]hen judges are dealing with the matrimonial home, they
nowadays have great regard to the fact that the house is
bought as a home in which the family is to be brought up. It is
not treated as property to be sold, nor as an investment to be
realised for cash.6 0
The widespread view that the home should be awarded based upon
the children's needs is further reinforced by a recent Law Commis-
sion report recommending that the needs of children be estab-
lished as a priority in financial orders upon divorce. 6'
C. Maryland
In 1978, Maryland adopted a domestic relations law that
clearly established a separate legal regime for the marital home. 62
Under the law, Maryland courts are disabled from changing title to
property 6 but may achieve an equitable distribution of property
acquired during the marriage by providing a monetary award to
reflect an equal division of the value of the marital property.'"
The act, however, separates the marital home and "family use per-
for the marital home. Glendon describes this as part of a similar shift within most family
property systems. Swedish law, for example, permits an award of the house to the one who
needs it most, usually the custodial parent. In France, a home held as separate property by
one spouse may be subjected to a lease in favor of the other if the latter retains custody of
the children. M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 81 n.114.
The trust for sale may persist for some time in England, as a bill that would have
provided a statutory basis for co-ownership of the marital home died in Parliament in Feb-
ruary 1980. Temkin, Property Relations During Marriage in England and Ontario, 30 INT'L
& Comp. L.Q. 190, 199-200 (1981). See also Murphy & Rawlings, The Matrimonial Homes
(Co-Ownership) Bill: The Right Way Forward?, 10 FAm. L. 136 (1980) (discussing the pro-
posed bill). Meanwhile, the strong pull of prima facie fairness is assuaged by recourse to a
"one-third" rule, see Gengler v. Gengler, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 275 (Fam.); Wachtel v. Wachtel,
1973 Fam. 72 (C.A.), establishing a presumption that each spouse is entitled to one-third of
the marital property. The rule has been criticized for being inadequate to accommodate the
parties' needs and too infeasible to adapt to all financial problems. See, e.g., Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1557, 1562-64 (C.A.); Cann v. Cann, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 938, 940-
42 (Fam. 1976); Smith v. Smith, [1975] 2 All E.R. 19, 22 (Fam.). But see Green, The Divorce
Debate, 1980: Fresh Thoughts on Ironing Out the Maintenance Muddle, The Times
(London), June 27, 1980, at 17e (describing the Wachtel rule as a useful rule of thumb).
1W0 Williams v. Williams, [1977] 1 All E.R. 28, 30 (C.A. 1976).
'e LAw COMMISSION, supra note 144, at 9.
16 Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (codified in relevant part at MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to -07 (1980)). For a discussion of the 1978 law and
the changes it brought to Maryland domestic relations law, see Legislation-Property Dis-
position Upon Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BAuLT. L. Rav.
377 (1979).
101 MO. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-03(a), 3-6A-04(a) (1980).
16 Id. § 3-6A-05.
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sonal property"1' 5 from other marital assets and gives the courts
discretion to grant a use and possession award of the former assets
for up to three years to the custodial spouse.""6 In exercising this
discretion, courts must consider the best interests of any minor
children and the spouses' interests in the home as a dwelling place
and as an investment.1 6 7
A recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals168 lists
the benefits intended by the Maryland statute. The court affirmed
the trial court's order of use and possession to the custodial spouse
during the period after the filing for divorce and prior to the final
divorce decree. The court rejected a due process challenge to the
statute in part because of the state's interest in child welfare, rely-
ing on the legislature's stated goal in enacting the section to give
"particular and favorable attention"16  to the needs of children. 170
The court found that "[tihe procedure provided for in [the statute]
seeks to avoid uprooting the children from the home, school, social
and community setting upon which they are dependent, especially
during the period of parental separation. 17 1
Even so, the statute falls short of a solution to the problem of
accommodating the children's needs upon divorce because the ju-
dicial discretion to recognize those needs is limited to a three-year
award and restricted to a "use and possession" arrangement.
'" "Family use personal property" is defined as "tangible personal property, acquired
during the marriage, owned by either spouse or owned jointly by both spouses, and used
primarily for family purposes." Id. § 3-6A-01(c). Maryland courts also have power to deter-
mine possession of the property regardless of title, id. § 3-6A-06(c)(1), and to make orders
for payment of mortgage, maintenance, insurance, taxes, and other expenses connected with
the property, id. § 3-6A-06(c)(2).
I- Id. § 3-6A-06.
147 Id. § 3-6A-06(a) directs courts to determine occupancy of the home with reference to
the following factors:
(1) The best interests of any minor child;
(2) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use per-
sonal property or occupy or use the family home or any portion of it as a dwelling
place;
(3) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use per-
sonal property or occupy or use the family home or any part of it for the production of
income;
(4) Any hardship imposed upon the spouse whose interest in the family home or
family use personal property is infringed upon by an order issued under this section.
The statute's preamble states that "if there are minor children in the family, their interest
must be given particular and favorable attention." Id. preamble.
14 Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980).
1 See supra note 167.
170 287 Md. at 30-33, 410 A.2d at 1058-60.
171 Id. at 31, 410 A.2d at 1059.
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IV. DISCUSSION
For the purpose of making the marital home available to meet
the needs of the custodial parent and children, the studies under-
taken in California suggest that there is little to recommend abso-
lute equality. The wide discretion available under an equitable di-
vision regime avoids the inflexibility inherent in a requirement of
equal division.
When the New York legislature considered an equitable divi-
sion bill patterned after the UMDA," however, supporters of a
bill requiring a presumption of equality suggested that equitable
distribution would result in a species of inequality and an increase
in litigation. Inequality, they argued, would arise from the unequal
treatment of like cases at the hands of different judges.1  This is
probably true, but it seems both unremarkable and unavoidable;
the same type of inequality is present in a presumption of equality,
since rebutting either presumption would entail balancing the
same factors. Even when strictly equal division is required, more-
over, different judges will accept different valuations of the assets
at issue.17 4 Finally, it may be an equally objectionable species of
inequality to treat dissimilar cases identically. When equal division
is required or presumed because of a general principle of partner-
ship in marriage and equality in property division, individuals'
needs for the home may be disregarded even when the marriage
was not a partnership and the spouses' post-divorce needs are not
the same.
In support of the argument that the equitable division rule
might increase litigation, it was suggested that parties unsure of
how much they might get in court in an equitable division would
be more likely to take a chance and litigate. A presumption of
equality, on the other hand, would encourage only those with sub-
stantial property or an overwhelming case to pursue litigation.17 5
Yet a presumption of equality would not necessarily discourage lit-
igation because both the application of the presumption and the
actual division might be challenged. And if a presumption of
equality would reduce litigation, it might do so at the expense of
fairness-parties with neither substantial property nor an over-
whelming case may nevertheless have a need for unequal division
of property. The need for the home, moreover, may rest primarily
172 See generally supra notes 50, 52 and accompanying text.
27 See Sassower, supra note 52.
174 See supra note 96.
17 See Sassower, supra note 52.
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with the children and not with the parties at all. By employing a
presumption in favor of equality, one relies in effect on the parties
to raise the issue of special treatment of the home. Such reliance is
likely misplaced, since divorce is a time of emotional stress and
financial pressure.
Though on balance the UMDA's equitable division seems to
provide a preferable framework for decisions regarding the marital
home, its uncertainty is admittedly a problem.178 Certainty is im-
portant because only a very small percentage of divorces are set-
tled in court,1 77 and it may be that "the primary function of con-
temporary divorce law [is to] . . . provid[e] a framework for
divorcing couples themselves to determine their respective rights
and responsibilities after dissolution.1' 7 Legal rules are a starting
point for divorcing parties bargaining in the shadow of the law:1 79
"The legal rules governing alimony, child support, marital property
and custody give each parent certain claims based on what each
would get if he or she simply went to court and had the court im-
pose some allocation."180 If legal rules are uncertain, the weaker
party will have little bargaining power with a greater risk of ineq-
uitable settlement.
Though uncertainty is a legitimate objection to the equitable
division statutes as they have been applied in the United States,
the evidence from Great Britain illustrates that judges can exercise
statutory discretion in a predictable way to maximize the interests
of the children of the marriage when awarding the home. 81 En-
glish judges have articulated clear goals that guide home awards
and minimize uncertainty. The guiding principles remain unlegis-
lated, though they are under consideration in Parliament.18 2
17' See supra notes 18-57 and accompanying text. The outer limits of the wide discre-
tion allowed by equitable division were reached in December 1981, when a county court in
Michigan (not a UMDA state) awarded the marital home to the children of the marriage,
giving the divorcing parents visitation rights. Church v. Church, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1070
(Mich. Cir. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1981). In the aftermath the parties expressed their satisfaction
with the arrangement. See Wichita Eagle-Beacon, Jan. 20, 1982, at 3A, col. 2.
177 It has been estimated that courts see only 10 to 12% of the divorces of parties with
children. Wallerstein, The Child in the Divorcing Family, JUDGES' J., Winter 1980, at 16, 18.
178 R. MNooKIN, BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: THE CASE OF DIVORCE 1
(Working Paper No. 3, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University, February 1979).
Mnookin's detailed study of private ordering in family law identifies four factors that oper-
ate to order private divorce settlements: 1) party preferences, 2) the rules of law, 3) the
uncertainty of these rules, and 4) transaction costs. Id. at 15.
179 Id. at 18.
180 Id.
See supra notes 140-61 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 159.
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The British system allows judges to define their goals without
check and to refine the mechanisms toward their chosen ends. In
the case of the marital home, judges have focused on children's
needs and have developed the Mesher order to meet them.183 The
extent to which precedent binds judges to these goals is not clear,
however, and uncertainty therefore persists. This uncertainty may
inhibit challenges from parties who are dissatisfied with court
awards, and it dilutes the notice to parties settling out of court.
The Maryland statute represents an American response to the
uncertainty problem. The statute treats the marital home indepen-
dently of other property, but it falls short of a solution to chil-
dren's needs on divorce. Judicial discretion to recognize those
needs is limited to a three-year award restricted to a "use and pos-
session" arrangement. If the children are small or the family is
large, three years may be hardly enough time for the custodial par-
ent to care for the children, train for a job, and arrange for alterna-
tive housing. The Maryland statute gives parties a high degree of
certainty but frustrates attempts to provide for children's needs
beyond the legislatively imposed limits.1 84
CONCLUSION
The unique nature of the marital home argues for a separate
legal regime for the disposition of that property upon divorce.
There is evidence that such a regime is developing in Anglo-Ameri-
can equitable distribution systems, primarily in recognition of chil-
dren's needs. Attempts to develop effective separate rules for the
home in equal division states have been less successful. Data com-
piled in California indicate that many homes are sold in compli-
ance with the state's equal division requirement, which suggests
that in such a rigid framework judges cannot effectively take ac-
count of the special needs of the children and the custodial parent.
Though equitable distribution systems are less susceptible to
criticism on grounds of inequity, a system which relies on judicial
discretion lacks certainty. Certainty in legal rules is crucial, since
only a small percentage of divorces are decided in court. The Brit-
ish experience demonstrates, however, that equity and certainty
are not incompatible. In Britain, judges have articulated needs
283 See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
'" Weitzman, supra note 2, has recommended legislative adoption of a presumption
that the home be awarded to the custodial parent. Id. at 1266. Such a presumption could be
made contingent on a financial arrangement that would allow the custodial parent to keep
the home.
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principles which inject predictability into home awards; the chil-
dren's interests will thus be maximized. It is unclear whether the
British practice can be transplanted to the United States. Under
similar equitable distribution statutes, courts in most states have
been reluctant to set out clear goals, perhaps fearful of being ac-
cused of judicial lawmaking. The most prominent legislative at-
tempt to balance needs with certainty, the Maryland statute,
seems to have erred on the side of certainty.
The statutory developments that reveal these problems in
marital law are recent, and quick responses run the risk of aggra-
vating the unfairness of divorce. Nevertheless, once one compre-
hends the seriousness with which children's needs should be con-
sidered and the superficial fairness of equal division, it becomes
apparent that equal division should be rejected and that systems
which can respond to parties' needs should be pursued.
Martha F. Davis
